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Last night I visited the San Francisco Museum of  Modern Art. As so often 
happens when I go to a museum, something in particular stands out and 
proves memorable. This time it was the exhibit of  design ideas by Dieter 
Rams, who worked many years for the Braun Corporation and brought us so 
many sleek, beautiful, and yet functional designs. One of  his design slogans 
was printed in bold on the wall: “Question everything generally thought to 
be obvious.” What that meant practically is that Rams continually rethought 
design from the ground up. And that idea captures quite nicely what I am 
trying to say. In what follows, I intend to elaborate on this theme as it relates 
to philosophy and what it means to the philosophical way of  life.
Not so long ago, the idea of  “Christian Philosophy” would have been 
considered an oxymoron not merely among many conservative Protestants, 
but also among professional philosophers. To be sure, there is a long and 
distinguished history of  Christian philosophy. It is not too much to say that 
some of  the greatest philosophers of  Western philosophy have been avowedly 
Christian, and many less so. Yet one only has to look back about fi fty years to 
realize that—at that point—philosophy in conservative Christian colleges had 
a very awkward place (assuming it had one at all) and evangelical philosophers 
(to speak of  the tradition in which I work) were generally absent from the 
wider philosophical landscape. Of  course, there were some professors (such 
as Alvin Plantinga and Arthur F. Holmes, to whose memory this paper is 
dedicated) who were active as philosophers. Plantinga published God and Other 
Minds with Cornell University Press back in 1967. But Holmes was far more 
typical of  the time: his work was generally more popular and published by such 
presses as InterVarsity Press and Eerdmans (which also published a number 
of  books by Plantinga). By and large, the big university presses simply weren’t 
possible venues for explicitly Christian philosophers. Nor would it have been 
thinkable to imagine a conservative, outspokenly Christian philosopher as the 
president of  the American Philosophical Association.
How times have changed! One need consider only who currently publishes 
books by Christian philosophers: all the major presses. Given that the list of  
past presidents of  the American Philosophical Association includes the likes 
of  Eleonore Stump and Plantinga, it is safe to say that even the highest ranks 
of  the American Philosophical Association are no longer off  limits. Moreover, 
it is exciting to think that there are more than 1,000 people who are willing to 
1This presentation was the keynote address for the Society of  Adventist 
Philosophers, San Francisco, California, November 17-18, 2011.
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publicly call themselves “Christians” as members of  the Society of  Christian 
Philosophers. Nor is this phenomenon limited to analytic philosophers. It is 
telling that Jean-Luc Marion, whose Christian faith is evident whenever he 
speaks, is considered to be the most important living French philosopher, 
attested by his becoming a member of  the Académie Française. And Marion is not 
alone: his colleague Jean-Louis Chrétien, who converted to Christianity after 
landing his position at the Sorbonne, writes from such an obviously Christian 
perspective that there could be no question about his faith. In the more or less 
“continental” version of  the Society for Continental Philosophy and Theology, 
the organization in which I serve as executive director—we have nearly three 
hundred people. Many of  those would be considered conservative Christians.
So there is good reason to think that the term “Christian Philosophy” 
makes considerably more sense today than it has in the last half-century. And, 
yet, it is safe to say that “Christian Philosophy” has always been a contested 
term. What, then, are we to make of  philosophy’s relation to Christianity? 
That you have titled this year’s conference “Teaching Philosophy: Promise or 
Peril?” is good evidence that the problem has not gone away. It certainly hasn’t 
gone away at Wheaton College, though the situation is markedly different 
from what it was fi fty years ago. There is so much that one could say about the 
relation of  Christianity to philosophy that one hardly knows where to begin. 
So I have chosen to focus on Christianity and its relation to philosophy as 
spelled out in its early days, particularly the fi rst couple of  centuries. Without 
doubt, there are the “glory days” of  the medieval period, in which philosophy 
and theology are so closely linked as to be inseparable. Yet our time is much 
more like that of  early Christianity in which there are many competing views 
all seeking to be heard.
In what follows, I want to accomplish the following. First, I will consider 
the original confl ict between Christianity and philosophy and how that confl ict 
gets spelled out in Scripture. There are several texts that are relevant here. 
Second, I turn to how early Christianity positioned itself  vis-à-vis philosophy. 
As we will see, like other movements of  thought in ancient Greece and Rome, 
Christianity was put forth as an alternative “way of  life” to that of  Stoicism and 
Epicureanism. That is, it was put forth as a variant of  philosophy. From my 
perspective, that way of  seeing Christianity is just as helpful today—perhaps 
even more so. Third, I will turn to what I take to be the outcome of  living 
philosophically, that of  becoming “radically undogmatic” (to use Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s phrase). What he means by such a phrase is a continual openness 
to questions, particularly regarding oneself.
Vain Philosophy vs. Christian Philosophy
So let me begin by turning back to Scripture to see how philosophy is portrayed. 
If  there is anything like a biblical locus classicus for the idea that Christianity and 
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philosophy don’t mix, one can fi nd it in the Pauline epistles. Here I consider 
three Pauline texts, together with what can be read as a “reply” from 1 Peter. 
The fi rst of  these passages is found in Col 2:8, ESV2: “See to it that no 
one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human 
tradition, according to the elemental spirits of  the world, and not according 
to Christ.” While it might seem at fi rst glance that Paul is warning against 
philosophy per se, a closer look at the passage reveals that his admonition is 
more nuanced than that. Literally translated, Paul is warning against philosophy 
that “makes a prey of  you.” Being captive here means that one is so held by 
the grip of  such philosophy that one is unable to question it. “Falling prey” 
is what happens when we believe something without adequate scrutiny. Yet 
there is more going on here. Given that Paul has just described Christ as the 
one who holds “all the treasures of  wisdom [sophias] and knowledge” (Col 2:2-
3), he can hardly be read as being against philosophy. For philosophers are, by 
defi nition, lovers of  wisdom [sophia]. So Paul is against any kind of  “sham” 
wisdom, anything that is offered as true by way of  what he calls “plausible 
arguments” (Col 2:4). What Paul has in mind becomes even clearer when we 
consider the two terms that he pairs with it: kênas apatės (Col 2:8). Kenos can 
be translated as “impotent,” “false,” or “empty.” Apatė can be translated as 
“deception,” “seduction,” “trickery,” or “deceit.” If  we take them together, 
“empty deceit” is really just nothing that passes itself  off  as something. Kênas 
is rendered by the KJV as “vain,” and that gets at something important: such 
philosophy is “in vain,” for it is nothing; yet it is also “vain,” for its origin is 
human pride. So Paul is not talking about just any philosophy: he is talking 
about the kind that takes human knowledge to be the measure of  all things. 
Such philosophy has its roots in vanity. Its practitioners are characterized by a 
conceit of  the self.3 These aspects of  vanity and conceit are central to Paul’s 
other comments on philosophy and knowledge.
This leads us to a second passage that is even more important in the 
Pauline corpus, 1 Corinthians 1. Paul says that he did not proclaim the gospel 
with “eloquent wisdom” (1 Cor 1:17). The phrase he uses is “sophia logou,” 
which can be translated as “eloquent wisdom” (as the NRSV translates it), 
“clever rhetoric,” or “sophisticated speech.” What is particularly interesting 
is that this phrase contains both of  the two words at issue for us here: sophia 
(wisdom) and logos (reason). Neither of  these terms is used here in a positive 
way. Yet Paul is in no way undermining either wisdom or reason per se. Instead, 
he is talking about a kind of  cleverness of  speaking that was often identifi ed 
with the ancient Sophists and which Socrates explicitly criticizes when he denies 
2Unless otherwise noted, all biblical quotations will come from the ESV.
3For more on this, see Bruce Ellis Benson, Graven Ideologies: Nietzsche, Derrida and 
Marion on Modern Idolatry (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002).
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(in the Apology) having made “the weaker argument defeat the stronger.”4 
Yet Paul also goes on to give a strange and unexpected juxtaposition of  the 
“word” and the “cross”: “For the reason [logos] of  the cross is foolishness 
to those who are perishing.” Here he brings together two terms—logos and 
stauros—that would seem to be characterized by a magnetic repulsion. How 
can the phrase “Ho logos gar ho tou staurou” [“For the logos of  the Cross,” which 
Paul describes as “folly”] fi nd a place in reason, when the cross is perhaps the 
ultimate symbol of  the irrational? Christ’s humiliation and death would seem 
to be the end of  any sort of  “reason.” If  we turn to Paul’s use of  the term 
“wisdom,” we see that he goes on at some length contrasting “the wisdom 
of  the world” with “the wisdom of  God.” Although Paul speaks of  God’s 
“foolishness,” he makes it clear that “God [has] made foolish the wisdom 
of  the world” (1 Cor 1:20). So Paul is in no way denigrating sophia, but he is 
indeed denigrating “the wisdom of  the world.” Paul introduces the cross to 
subvert human wisdom. Given all human expectations regarding power and 
reason, the cross doesn’t make any sense: it is the inversion of  power and the 
subversion of  reason.5
Yet what does Paul mean? We have seen that Paul does not denigrate 
sophia. He is not against wisdom per se. Nor is he against logos. Instead, it makes 
far more sense to read Paul as criticizing some sort of  reason. And here we 
come to the nub of  the issue: the problem isn’t with reason per se or even with 
a particular brand of  reason (such as Platonism or Stoicism). Instead, Paul is 
countering reason that is, just as in the passage we considered in Colossians, 
vain and puffed up. It is reason that boastfully assumes it knows. Paul 
associates this boasting with worldly wisdom (1 Cor 3:18-21). One can see 
the contrast when Paul speaks of  Christ Jesus, “who became for us wisdom 
from God” (1 Cor 1:30). Thus Paul says, “let the one who boasts, boast in the 
Lord” (1 Cor 1:31; see Jer 9:23-24). Of  course, Paul is not alone in criticizing 
arrogance and conceit: Socrates made a career out of  criticizing those who 
arrogantly claim “to know,” when in fact they really know nothing. Indeed, 
Socrates often claims that he does not know and maintains that learning is 
only possible if  one recognizes one’s lack of  knowledge. So “the wisdom of  
the world” comes, again, with an infl ated view of  the self. On this Paul is 
clear. One way of  putting this hubris is that the Corinthians did not question 
themselves as much as they should have done.
This becomes even more obvious when we consider what Paul says in 1 
Corinthians 8. There Paul says that “‘knowledge’ puffs up, but love builds up” 
[gnosis phusioi, agape oikodomei] (1 Cor 8:1). Paul quotes the arrogant Corinthian 
4Plato, Apology 19c.
5I develop this interpretation at greater length in my article, “The ‘Thinking-after’ 
of  Metanoia: On Breton’s The Word and the Cross,” Philosophy and Theology 16 (2004): 
219-228.
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claim right back at them when he says “we all know [pantes gnôsin exomen]” 
and connects it with the phrase “oidamen hoti,” the result being the phrase 
“we know that we know.” What disturbs Paul is their brutal arrogance and 
pretensions to knowledge. If  one says “oidamen hoti pantes gnôsin exomen,” then 
one is making a very strong claim indeed. The verb oida (to know) comes from 
the root eidô (to see). In Plato’s philosophy, for instance, knowing the eidos of  
something means that one has grasped it perfectly. The kind of  knowledge 
that oida provides is “comprehension,” as opposed to “apprehension.” 
Whereas comprehension is to “conceive fully or adequately,”6 apprehension 
suggests incompleteness.  “Adequately” here does not mean “good enough,” 
but “adequation” in the sense of  the medieval phrase adaequatio intellectus et 
rei—a perfect one-to-one correspondence between the mind and the object 
of  thought. In the NT, oida is often used in this sense of  knowing perfectly or 
fully. So the Corinthians claim to have something like “perfect knowledge,” 
and that puffs them up with pride. It is no wonder that Paul is upset.7
Having seen that Paul is hardly against reason and wisdom per se, I want 
to close this fi rst section by turning to 1 Pet 3:15. If  Col 2:8 seems to be a 
threat to Christian philosophers, then 1 Pet 3:15 can be read as their biblical 
justifi cation. For we are called to provide “a defense [apologian] to anyone 
who demands from you an accounting [logon] for the hope that is in you.” 
The context for this passage is the persecution facing Christians at the time. 
Peter is exhorting them to stand fi rm and to be ready to explain their faith 
whenever asked. Giving a logos for one’s belief  and action would have been a 
perfectly understandable demand by a Greek. In effect, he says: you should 
be prepared to give a rational account of  why you believe and act as you do. 
One can hardly quibble with that expectation. Yet Peter goes on to stress that 
they should do so “with gentleness and reverence.” One way of  framing what 
he says is that it is in marked contrast to what we saw in the Corinthians. They 
manifest neither gentleness nor respect. Thus Peter’s injunction can be seen 
as being like Paul’s in an important respect. There is to be no haughtiness 
of  spirit when one gives an account of  one’s faith. Indeed, if  the hope that 
is within us is ultimately Christ crucifi ed and raised from the dead, then our 
hope is not in ourselves, but in Christ. We do not proclaim the wisdom of  
the world, but a “wisdom” that challenges the wisdom of  the world. Yet it 
does so not in the sense of  abandoning wisdom, but of  going beyond it to 
a higher sort of  wisdom. Such “wisdom” involves a kind of  recognition of  
the limits of  our knowledge. We become questioners who question ourselves. 
6The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), s.v. 
“comprehend.”
7Here I draw from my article, “The Economies of  Knowledge and Love in Paul,” 
in Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, eds., Transforming Philosophy and Religion: 
Love’s Wisdom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) 28-41.
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Moreover, it is a kind of  wisdom that we are called not just to believe, but to 
live out. This brings us to the second part of  the paper, in which we consider 
how Christianity is a way of  living one’s life.
Philosophy as a Way of  Life
More than anyone else, Pierre Hadot has helped remind us that, for the 
ancients, philosophy is nothing other than a way of  life—a way of  existing 
in the most everyday and ordinary way. That philosophy has come in our 
time to be something not readily available to the masses is perhaps the worst 
development in its history. As much as one mourns the recent closings of  
philosophy departments in the UK, they are not all that surprising: some 
philosophers have done an excellent job of  clothing their speech in jargon, 
publishing articles that can only be read by a few, and holding themselves 
aloof  from public life. It should not be shocking that, as a result, they are 
deemed irrelevant by society.
Yet it was not always so. Both ancient and medieval philosophies were 
seen as fi rst and foremost ways of  living. To be sure, Plato and Augustine (for 
example) give us what we today would term metaphysical, epistemological, 
and moral theories. But their goal was to give us philosophies to live by that 
are only secondarily theoretical. Recovering this applicability to everyday life 
is of  prime importance to answering the question of  what philosophy’s role 
should be in a Christian college. We are, to put it boldly, teaching students how 
to live life. True, there are aspects of  Christian philosophy that put it deeply at 
odds with other sorts of  philosophy—though these differences should not 
be overemphasized—but the basic idea of  living “the good life” is as much a 
part of  Aristotelianism as it is of  Christianity. 
What does that mean practically? At the beginning of  Hadot’s What 
Is Ancient Philosophy? he quotes Kant, who writes: “The ancient Greek 
philosophers, such as Epicurus, Zeno, and Socrates, remained more faithful 
to the Idea of  the philosopher than their modern counterparts have done. 
. . . ‘When will you fi nally begin to live virtuously’, said Plato to an old man 
who told him he was attending classes on virtue. The point is not always to 
speculate, but also ultimately to think about applying our knowledge.”8 Ethics 
are fi rst and foremost about becoming a certain kind of  person, which is why 
ethics professors who aren’t ethical seem like such a contradiction in terms. 
Consider what Plutarch says about philosophy as something one does:
Most people imagine that philosophy consists in delivering discourses from 
the heights of  a chair, and in giving classes based on texts. But what these 
people utterly miss is the uninterrupted philosophy which we see being 
8Immanuel Kant, Lectures on the Philosophical Encyclopedia, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. 29, Abt. 4,1.1, Vorlesungen. Kleine Vorlesungen und Ergaenzungen (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter 1980), 9 and 12.
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practiced every day in a way which is perfectly equal to itself. . . . Socrates did 
not set up a grandstand for his audience and did not sit upon a professorial 
chair; he had no fi xed timetable for talking and walking with his friends. 
Rather, he did philosophy sometimes by joking with them, or by drinking 
or going to war or to the market with them, and fi nally by going to prison 
and drinking poison. He was the fi rst to show that at all times and in every 
place, in everything that happens to us, daily life gives us the opportunity 
to do philosophy.9
The love of  “sophia,” then, is not some kind of  theoretical love, but a 
practical one. The focus here was on becoming a certain kind of  person, rather 
than simply knowing. Philosophy is an activity in which we remake our lives. 
Plato defi nes philosophy as training for death. One aspect of  this training 
is that one is preparing for one’s own death. That means that one learns to 
live in the moment. Carpe diem can sound almost trite to us today; yet it is a 
profound insight in light of  one’s ever-approaching death. While the Christian 
view of  the afterlife signifi cantly recontextualizes this insight, it in no way 
negates it: as one Christian monk once noted, “Since the beginning of  our 
conversation, we have come closer to death. Let us be vigilant while we still 
have the time.” If, as Christians, we combine this idea of  training for death 
with dying with Christ—so not just a literal death, but also death to self  and 
sin—the idea becomes even more profound. We are dying in multiple senses. 
The Christian notion of  “conversion” (metanoia) is that of  a fundamental, 
180-degree reorientation of  the self. It is nothing short of  a movement 
in which we become different persons and thus die to self. Yet something 
very much like this idea of  conversion is actually to be found in ancient 
philosophy. Hadot reminds us of  the prominent place that askêsis plays in 
ancient philosophy. While the term askêsis is often translated as “asceticism,” 
it is much better translated as “spiritual exercises” that concern both body 
and soul. They are designed so that we (to quote Hadot) “let ourselves be 
changed, in our point of  view, attitudes, and convictions. This means that we 
must dialogue with ourselves, hence do battle with ourselves.”10 According 
to Hadot, the goal of  askêsis is to bring about “a conversion which turns our 
entire life upside down, changing the life of  the person who goes through 
it.”11 So metanoia and askêsis end up being remarkably similar.
Further, while Christians tend to think that spiritual exercises or disciplines 
are something unique to Christianity, the reality is that such disciplines long 
predate its advent. Thus early Christians imported such disciplines from 
pagan philosophy and Judaism, adapting them for distinctively Christian 
9Plutarch, Whether a Man Should Engage in Politics When He Is Old 26.796d.
10Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of  Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995) 91.
11Ibid. 83.
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ends. Further, as Christianity was trying to fi nd its own identity, the second-
century Apologists such as Justin Martyr and Clement of  Alexandria explicitly 
positioned Christianity as a competing philosophy—not just any philosophy 
but the true philosophy that had been prefi gured by earlier philosophers. And 
that emphasis was continued by such thinkers as Origen, the Cappodocian 
Fathers (Basil of  Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of  Nyssa). It is 
also to be found in John Chrysostom, who works out askêsis in the following 
way: he encourages those wishing to follow the way of  Christian faith to 
consider their souls to be like paintings or pieces of  sculpture. We are the 
works of  art that God has created, though God gives us the great honor of  
further fashioning ourselves. Of  course, we do not do so all by ourselves; 
indeed, Saint Chrysostom exhorts parents to be part of  the process with their 
children. By extension, so we all in Christian community are part of  helping 
fashion one another to become beautiful works of  art.
Of  course, Chrysostom was writing in a way that was very much 
conditioned by his time. The idea that one saw one’s own person as an 
artwork was common, whether one was a pagan, a Jew, or a Christian. The 
point of  studying ancient texts was to become different persons. As Peter 
Brown observes about readers in late antiquity, “the Classics, a literary 
tradition, existed for the sole purpose of  ‘making [persons] into classics’: 
exposure to the classics of  Greek and Latin literature was intended to 
produce exemplary beings, their raw humanity molded and fi led away by 
a double discipline, at once ethical and aesthetic.”12 The goal was to fi nd 
exemplary authors and fi gures to be emulated—and then to do so. We can 
connect this idea back to Paul, whose well-known exhortation is as follows: 
“I appeal to you therefore, brothers and sisters, by the mercies of  God, to 
present your bodies as a living sacrifi ce, holy and acceptable to God, which 
is your spiritual worship” (Rom 12:1).
Let me suggest that we read this verse with this small change of  wording: 
“I appeal to you therefore, brothers and sisters, by the mercies of  God, to 
present your bodies as a living, sacrifi cial work of  art.” This idea that we 
should view ourselves as works of  art becomes even more plausible when we 
consider what Paul says in Eph 2:10: “For we are his workmanship, created 
in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we 
should walk in them.” The word translated as “workmanship” could literally 
be translated as “work of  art,” since Paul uses the Greek term poiêma. So Paul 
quite explicitly says that we are God’s works of  art, a meaning that the English 
term “workmanship” fails to capture adequately. As God’s art works, we have 
been “created in Christ Jesus for good works,” and we fulfi ll God’s intentions 
for us when we “walk” in those good works. 
12Peter Brown, “The Saint as Exemplar in Late Antiquity,” Representations 1 
(1983): 1.
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Practically, though, what does the askêsis that develops us as living works 
of  art involve? Consider the following list of  activities: research, investigation, 
reading, listening, attention, self-mastery, and indifference to indifferent 
things.13 The most important of  these categories is that of  “attention” or 
“self-awareness.” What the Stoics called “prosoche” (attention) “supposes that, 
at each instant, we renew our choice of  life . . . and that we keep constantly 
present in our minds the rules of  life which express that choice.”14 The goal 
here is to be constantly aware of  what one is doing—one’s actions, thoughts, 
motivations—and thus constantly aware of  whom one is becoming. Given 
that Paul exhorts us not to be “conformed to this world” but instead to “be 
transformed” (Rom 12:2), such attention is surely appropriate. Under the 
category of  listening, we could place both prayer and meditation. When we 
engage in meditation, we allow God to speak to us, as well as to ruminate upon 
Christian teachings about how we ought to live. The result of  meditation, at 
least in principle, is that we are able to deal with anything that comes our way. 
For the Stoics, meditation involves remembering and even memorizing key 
maxims, dwelling upon them, and seeing how they can be put into practice. 
The point of  meditation is to transform both our thinking and our practice. 
Meditating on the fruit of  the Spirit (for example) can provide us with insight 
as to how we can live out such characteristics as patience and self-control. 
Indeed, Saint Paul calls us to think on those things that will lift up our gaze 
and our lives: “Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, 
whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing, whatever is commendable, if  there 
is any excellence and if  there is anything worthy of  praise, think about these 
things” (Phil 4:8). Then he goes on to connect these meditations to practice: 
“Keep on doing the things that you have learned and received and heard 
and seen in me, and the God of  peace will be with you” (Phil 4:9). Research, 
investigation, and reading all involve immersing ourselves in the truths of  
the Christian faith and considering how those truths should practically be 
expressed. Reading Scripture is clearly central to a distinctively Christian askêsis, 
but so is reading theology or classic Christian texts. We are also involved in 
research and investigation when we speak with fellow believers about living 
the life of  faith or when we seek out the counsel of  someone who is truly 
wise and mature in the faith. 
While we can clearly fi nd such emphases in the sources of  the Christian 
tradition, they are also to be found in philosophy. Christianity is not the only 
form of  prosoche. It is safe to say that we can learn quite a bit about attention 
to one’s self  from Socrates. As to research and investigation, one can learn 
much about being virtuous from Aristotle. Philosophers have much to teach 
13Hadot, 84. 
14Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 2004) 193.
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us, and this is something that we probably need to be better at explaining 
to our respective college administrations. To put this in different terms, 
the most important aspect of  what we are doing when we teach students 
philosophy is that we are teaching them to live life. It is not that philosophy 
simply teaches us about how to think: it does that, of  course, yet we can 
also learn courage from Socrates and resolution from Epictetus. To learn 
from them in no way means that we simply embrace their philosophers 
wholesale. Instead, we are always sifting the wheat from the chaff. But we 
must do this even when we read Christian theology—the difference is much 
more one of  degree than of  kind.
So far, what we have considered here have been mainly personal sorts of  
spiritual exercises. Yet there is another kind of  spiritual exercise about which 
Hadot reminds us: the Socratic dialogues. Hadot argues that it is Socrates who 
brings spiritual exercises—which likely have their origins in practices that go 
back to time immemorial—to the fore in a way that no previous philosopher 
had done. The Socratic dialogues are about putting the interlocutors through 
a rigorous examination. In other words, the topic is not merely some point 
of  belief  (though it is that too); it is also the very interlocutors themselves. 
Consider Socrates’ rebuke to the Athenian senate:
My very good friend, you are an Athenian and belong to a city which is the 
greatest and most famous in the world for its wisdom and strength. Are you 
not ashamed that you give your attention to acquiring as much money as 
possible, and similarly with reputation and honour, and give no attention or 
thought to truth [aletheia] and understanding [phronesis] and the perfection 
of  your soul?15
Shortly thereafter, Socrates goes on to say:
I have never lived an ordinary quiet life. I did not care for the things that 
most people care about—making money, having a comfortable home, high 
military or civil rank, and all the other activities, political appointments, 
secret societies, party organizations, which go on in our city. . . . I set myself  
to do you individually in private what I hold to be the greatest possible 
service. I tried to persuade each one of  you not to think more of  practical 
advantages than of  his mental and moral well-being.16
One could easily imagine such a claim from a Christian theologian or 
someone writing on living the Christian life. Socrates makes a claim about 
what is really important in life that is remarkably similar to what we as 
Christians would say.
With important notable exceptions, then, the kind of  life that Socrates 
tries to live is remarkably similar to the kind we as Christians try to live. Yet 
the Socratic dialogues likewise have a particular character that administrators 
15Plato, Apology 29d-e
16Ibid., 36b-c.
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of  Christian colleges may not necessarily appreciate: the dialogues don’t really 
have a set direction or outcome. In other words, the goal of  the dialogues 
is arriving at truth, wherever it may lie. Although the usual depiction of  the 
“Socratic Method” is that Socrates has in mind exactly where he intends to 
go—and asks questions accordingly—the reality is that Socrates frequently 
admits that he doesn’t know. In the eponymous dialogue, Meno says:
Socrates, even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are a 
perplexed man yourself  and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment I 
feel you are exercising magic and witchcraft upon me and positively laying me 
under your spell until I am just a mass of  helplessness. If  I may be fl ippant, 
I think that not only in outward appearance but in other respects as well you 
are exactly like the fl at sting ray that one meets in the sea. Whenever anyone 
comes into contact with it, it numbs him, and that is the sort of  thing that 
you seem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are literally numb, 
and I have nothing to reply to you. Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds 
of  times, held forth often on the subject in front of  large audiences, and 
very well too, or so I thought. Now I can’t even say what it is.
To this, Socrates replies: “It isn’t that, knowing the answers myself, I 
perplex other people. The truth is rather that I infect them also with the 
perplexity I feel myself. So with virtue now. I don’t know what it is. You may 
have known before you came into contact with me, but now you look as 
if  you don’t.17 Elsewhere, Socrates describes himself  precisely in terms of  
perplexity. He says, “I am utterly disturbing (atopos) and I create only perplexity 
(aporia).18 Yet achieving this state of  being atopos and having a sense of  aporia 
is part of  the very point of  the dialogues.
What I am suggesting here is that philosophy is a way of  life that works 
by way of  an askêsis that leads us both to knowledge and to aporia. To be sure, 
Socrates does not simply lead his listeners to aporia: There are many doctrines; 
most notably that of  the Forms that Socrates puts forth. To read the dialogues 
and think that Socrates does not have views regarding what is real, what we 
can know, and what we ought to do would be a signifi cant misreading. Living 
the Socratic life has defi nite contours that lead us to think and act in one way 
and not another. Yet aporia still plays an important role. On one hand, aporia is 
central to the idea of  Socratic ignorance. If  we assume that we already know 
something, it is impossible to learn it: we already know. In contrast, to ask 
is to admit that one does not know. As Gadamer puts it, “Discourse that is 
intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open by the 
question. . . . To ask a question means to bring into the open.”19 So no new 
17Plato, Meno 79e-80b, 80c-d.
18Plato, Theaetetus 149a.
19Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d rev. ed., trans Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989) 363.
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knowledge is possible if  we insist that we already know. And learning to admit 
our ignorance is actually quite diffi cult: it is part of  the askêsis of  knowing and 
questioning ourselves.
On the other hand, it is not as if  philosophy—or any other kind of  
thinking, for that matter—simply leads us onward and upward to ever more 
knowledge. Here we need to be quite clear about what this aporia really is. While 
the term often gets bandied about by postmodern thinkers—particularly those 
who’ve read Jacques Derrida—it is simply a part of  life. The Greek word poros 
means “a way,” either literally or fi guratively. With the addition of  the alpha 
privative, it means simply “without a way.” In other words, to reach a point of  
aporia is to be at a point where it seems as if  one can go no further. Yet it is not 
as if  one has simply gotten nowhere at all. As much as philosophy allows us to 
know, it always shows us that there is considerably more that we do not know. 
Or to put this problem in a different way: we always recognize—or at least 
we do if  we are paying attention—that our attempts to answer questions are 
imperfect and incomplete. We say, “Yes, we know this, but we do not know 
that.” This recognition actually returns us to Paul and the limits of  human 
reason. We are, thinks Paul, thinking far too highly of  human reason if  we 
think we either have all of  the answers or understand perfectly. It is not only 
in this way that human reason can go wrong, but we are certainly misguided 
if  we take reason to provide more than it can actually provide.
Derrida famously formulates the recognition of  aporia in terms of  doing 
justice. We always want to do justice to justice—or justice to anyone that we 
encounter—but we realize that any actual instantiation of  justice is never 
perfectly just. This is not to say that no justice is done; instead, it is to say that 
justice is both experienced and not experienced. In any concrete application 
of  justice, I am successful to a certain point. Much of  the time, our success is 
suffi cient enough that we simply don’t experience any sense of  justice being 
lacking. Yet, if  Aristotle is right that there is an exact “golden mean” in every 
situation, then it is not hard to conclude that we probably do not hit that 
exact point all that often. We may come remarkably close and even hit it on 
occasion, but even the well-developed phronimos [the one who has learned to 
live aright] is still “on the way.”
In seeing the limits of  what we know and how one question naturally 
leads to others, it is no wonder that Christian college administrations can 
fi nd philosophers to be somewhat menacing to the very project of  Christian 
education. For, as long as we think that a Christian education is ultimately some 
kind of  answer giving, then philosophy is a threat. It is far more peril than 
promise. Of  course, Christian educators are not alone here: in much the same 
way that Athens viewed Socrates as a threat to the established assumptions 
of  society, so philosophers have been under suspicion ever since. After all, 
the charge of  corrupting the youth has never really gone away. Even in the 
last ten-year review of  our department, I was asked to address specifi cally the 
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worry that somehow philosophy is leading students away from the faith. I’m 
pleased to say that my argument was found to be convincing. But I’m sad to 
say that such a worry was still present.
Here I turn to the last section of  my paper—what the askêsis of  
philosophy helps our students become.
Askêsis as Radical Openness
Given what we as philosophers attempt to do, the askêsis of  philosophy is the 
art of  both learning something and learning what we do not know. Without 
doubt, philosophy does lead us to truth. Yet it also continually reminds of  
what we do not and may not ever know, at least on this side of  eternity. 
Whereas the modern assumption regarding human knowledge was that, at 
some point in time, with enough hard work and cooperation, we would know 
all, the postmodern assumption that has replaced it is that human knowledge 
will never be full and transparent, however much it achieves. Given that 
realization, recovering the kind of  questioning typical of  Socrates provides 
us with the way to live. And here it is appropriate to turn to Gadamer and his 
idea of  radical openness.
Gadamer speaks of  the logical structure of  openness. He begins with 
the idea—that goes back to Hegel—that genuine experience is always negative. 
It is when we do not expect something that we actually have an experience. 
Otherwise, we are simply reliving old experiences, seeing what we have always 
seen. This is why Gadamer says that “strictly speaking, we cannot have the 
same experience twice.”20 What allows for a genuine experience? Questions, 
for they bring things into the open. A question breaks open what had 
previously been closed. It allows for the possibility of  a depth of  answer that 
we previously thought to be impossible, or even simply did not think about 
at all. As Plato has shown us, doxa—opinion—tends to suppress questions. 
We think we already know. If  you remember back to what we earlier observed 
about 1 Cor. 8:1, Paul summarizes the Corinthians’ hubris as “we know that 
we know.” This is their dogmatism. Paul, in contrast, serves as Socrates to the 
Corinthians by putting their dogmatism into question, using irony in a way 
that is quite Socratic in tone.
In contrast to such dogmatism, Gadamer speaks of  learning to be 
“radically undogmatic.” Here it is easy to miss what Gadamer has in mind, 
since radical undogmatism could simply sound like skepticism. Yet Gadamer 
goes on to say the following: “The dialectic of  experience has its proper 
fulfi llment not in defi nitive knowledge but in the openness to experience 
that is made possible by experience itself.”21 In other words, while it might 
seem that the end of  knowledge is that we come to a place where we now 
20Ibid., 353.
21Ibid., 355.
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fi nally know, Gadamer is saying that experience both gives us knowledge and 
makes us open to more knowledge. Instead of  the experienced person being 
the one who is closed—the one who already knows, so has nothing left to 
learn—experience teaches us that, however much we know, we still have more 
to learn. We take our knowledge seriously, in the sense that we think we really 
do know something. But we don’t take it seriously in the sense that we think 
we have now fi nally arrived. As the old saying has it, the more you know, 
the more you realize you don’t know. That is part of  what it means to be 
“experienced.” Of  course, all of  this is easy to say, but it is diffi cult to live out, 
for it means fi nding the golden mean between the extremes of  dogmatism 
and skepticism. 
Gadamer writes that “the art of  questioning is the art of  questioning 
even further—i.e., the art of  thinking.”22 That last point cannot be made too 
strongly. Thinking, strictly speaking, just is the art of  questioning. To think 
about something is to ask questions about it. Is it this way or that way? Do 
I get it “right” if  I say it like this, or should I say it some other way? Richard 
Rorty has famously given up on the project of  “getting things right.”23 But 
that is what we philosophers do: we try to get it right. And the only way 
that we can continue this project is by asking questions. We tend to say 
that something is “questionable” if  it seems incorrect or in need of  further 
questioning. But everything is “questionable” if  we mean that it can further 
be questioned—that we can know even more about it. Indeed, we can take this 
a step further. Gadamer points out that even ideas that occur to us suddenly 
have a structure to them that is like a question. When we have such ideas, we 
realize that we never saw things like that before. To see something in a new 
way is to put it into question.
What I’ve said so far may make it sound as if  questioning is simply a kind 
of  art that we could eventually master. To be sure, questioning is an art. It is 
something that takes a long time to learn. When Socrates is accused of  asking 
all the questions, his reply is that asking the questions is much harder than 
giving the answers. And he’s right. Yet the art of  questioning is something 
that cannot fully be mastered. When we start asking questions, we can never 
be sure in advance where they might take us. Consider what Gadamer says 
about conversation:
We say that we “conduct” a conversation, but the more genuine a 
conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of  either partner. 
Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. 
Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or 
even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with 
22Ibid., 367.
23See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989).
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the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may 
well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the 
leaders of  it than the led. No one knows in advance what will “come out” 
of  a conversation.24
A conversation in which we allow things to develop takes its own route. If  
we truly listen to what the other has to say, that may require us to go down paths 
we haven’t gone down before. This is not to say that we will simply agree with 
the other person; instead, we listen to the other with the assumption that the 
other may have something to teach us. But we do so with the goal of  “testing” 
what the other person has to say: we question the other. That may mean that 
we discover the other’s point to be defi cient in some way(s). Yet it may also 
mean that we fi nd ourselves to be defi cient. As Gadamer puts it, “it is possible 
that someone practicing the art of  dialectic—i.e., the art of  questioning and of  
seeking truth—comes off  worse in the argument in the eyes of  those listening 
to it.”25 Gadamer speaks of  one being “pulled up short.”26 His reference is 
to the experience of  reading a text and fi nding that it challenges us, but the 
same—even more forcefully—can take place when we dialogue with another 
person and discover that the other understands better.
The goal of  all this back and forth—whether with a text, another person, 
or an idea—is that we come to truth. Gadamer may sound overly confi dent 
when he closes Truth and Method by saying that the “discipline of  questioning 
and inquiring . . . guarantees truth,” but that is what philosophers have 
thought from the very beginning of  philosophy. When we take our students 
and introduce them to the discipline of  questioning, we also share in that 
assumption, one that we have seen to be true. We work toward “coming to 
the truth,” realizing that it is not something which we fi nd immediately, even 
though we do actually fi nd it. This is the promise of  philosophy and also 
something that philosophy has actually delivered.
Yet philosophy also delivers questions. Questions are the means by 
which we get to truth, but getting to truth is not the end of  questioning but 
the enriching of  our questions.
To do so would not make the questions go away. Instead, the goal would 
be to draw more people—more of  our students, for instance—into this 
questioning way of  life and to show why it matters in the deepest possible 
sense and at the most practical level. To be sure, when students are introduced 
to this way of  life, it is somewhat threatening. They learn that some of  the 
things they’ve always thought might be wrong, or at least too simplistic, but 
it does not take them too long to realize that the alternative of  going back to 
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of  life in which not all answers are simple takes time and involves askêsis. It is 
one thing to be an adolescent who questions everything; it is quite another to 
know how to ask productive questions, ones that push us toward knowledge, 
ones that open rather than shut doors. Such a life is a life of  promise: we offer 
students the chance to become thoughtful questioners and discover truth.
Christian philosophy as a way of  life is an askêsis—one develops into a 
thoughtful questioner and becomes a work of  art. We aspire to be the phronimos—
the one who knows and exhibits practical wisdom. We become works of  art 
in Christ by becoming questioners who learn how to appropriately question 
everything, but most of  all ourselves.
